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(see, e.g., Hausman 1981 ). There have also been attempts to investigate the labor supply effects of free center-based care (Robins 1988a ), subsidies to low-income single parents (Berger and Black 1992), child care tax subsidies (Ribar 1990 Averett et al. 1992; Michalopoulos et al. 1992) , and child care subsidies generally (Blau 1989) .
Taxes and subsidies introduce nonlinearities into the household budget constraint. As an illustration, consider the case of a married couple with one child in 1985 in which the couple had no unearned income, the husband had an annual earned income of $5,000, and the wife had an available wage rate of $3.50.3 Assuming that the couple paid social security taxes, took the standard deductions, exemptions, and available credits, and did not pay for child care, the wife's effective budget constraint is described by figure la. Examining figure la, there is a convex kink at hours point A (the maximum hours at which the family could claim the full value of the Earned Income Tax Credit [EITC]), a convex kink at B (the point at which the family had positive taxable income), and a nonconvex kink at C (the point at which the EITC would be exhausted).
Figure lb depicts the same family's budget constraint but assumes that they paid child care costs of 75 cents for each hour the mother worked. In the absence of subsidies, the budget constraint has a flatter slope but essentially the same shape as before. However, the family could have reduced its tax liability by the amount of the nonrefundable Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit (CDCTC).4 In this case, the CDCTC would exceed the family's tax liability at every point along the budget constraint. Thus, once the EITC was exhausted, the family would pay only the social security tax, resulting again in a nonconvex kink at C.
Estimation of care utilization and labor supply functions becomes substantially more complicated in the presence of nonlinear budget constraints like those described earlier and those depicted in figures la and lb. One obvious complication involves the computation of effective wage rates, 3 These figures are obviously not representative of all families. The figures were selected to demonstrate the interaction of tax and subsidy programs for low-income families. There are other kinks and notches in the budget constraints for middleand upper-income families. 4 The CDCTC ranges from 30% of eligible child care expenditures for families that earn less than $10,000 per year to 20% of care expenditures for families that earn more than $28,000. Eligible expenditures are $2,400 per year for one child and $4,800 for two or more children. Thus, the maximum credit is $720 for one child or $1,440 for two or more children. However, due to its nonrefundability, few families receive these maximum amounts. In 1985 the CDCTC cost the federal government $3.128 million (U.S. Department of the Treasury 1988). This represents roughly 60% of all federal child care expenditures for 1985. marginal costs, and incomes. Another problem is that families' observed locations along the budget set depend on their preferences and are not generated entirely at random. Thus, the estimation procedure must account for the possibility of self-selection in the effective wages and marginal costs.5 Previous child care studies have adopted different strategies in trying to correct for this type of selectivity. Ribar (1990) and Michalopoulos et al. (1992) estimated partially structural models and used instruments for aftertax wages and care costs. In principle, structural estimators derived directly from the family's preference function facilitate nonlinear budget constraint estimation by providing an explicit representation of the source of selectivity. Structural methods also yield estimates of preference parameters which are independent of the budget constraint, thereby facilitating detailed policy simulation. Unfortunately, neither Michalopoulos et al. nor Ribar implemented the full set of restrictions implied by their respective structural models; moreover, neither study estimated all of the preference parameters necessary for simulation exercises.6 Using an alternative econometric approach, Averett et al. (1992) examined the labor supply effects of care costs and the CDCTC. Their model incorporated all of the selectivity restrictions implied by nonlinearities in the convex portion of the CDCTC. However, the model did not consider any other features of the tax system and did not address the endogeneity of paid care utilization.
This article estimates a fully structural, discrete-choice model of married mothers' care arrangements and labor supply. In particular, the article develops a full-information maximum likelihood specification which relies on direct utility comparisons over women's decisions to work zero, parttime, or full-time hours and utilize paid or unpaid care. This approach extends the previous work of Michalopoulos et al. and Ribar by providing estimates of all of the relevant utility parameters and by allowing effective wages and care costs to vary across alternative work and care utilization states. Unlike Averett et al., the article's empirical specification incorporates general features of the tax system including nonconvex regions of the CDCTC.
Estimation reveals that married women's labor supply is relatively sensitive to changes in hourly wages but insensitive to changes in care costs. Among employed women who pay for care, an increase in care costs ap-'Appropriate estimation methods are reviewed by Hausman (1985) and Moffitt (1 990). 6 Michalopoulos et al. (1992) estimated structural care expenditure and labor supply functions conditional on reduced-form labor force participation and paid care utilization equations. Their procedure did not explicitly examine the determinants of unpaid arrangements. Ribar (1990) estimated structural paid and unpaid care utilization equations conditional on a reduced-form specification for labor supply; his study did not examine the structural determinants of work decisions. Both studies used an instrumental variables approach which eliminated the endogeneity of wages and prices but did not incorporate budget-induced selectivity restrictions.
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Ribar pears to increase the attractiveness of unpaid nonmaternal arrangements rather than maternal care. Overall, mothers with preschool-age children are found to be less sensitive to wage and care cost changes than other mothers. Simulations based on the article's structural estimates are conducted to examine the behavioral implications of alternative tax and subsidy policies. The simulations indicate that the existing CDCTC has a modest positive effect on labor supply and a stronger positive effect on paid care uti1 zation.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section II develops a conceptual model of child care and hours of work. An empirical representation of that model is derived in Section III. Section IV describes the data sources and the analysis extract. Estimation results and policy simulations appear in Section V. The paper concludes in Section VI.
II. Conceptual Model
Consider a 1-period model in which a family has preferences over market goods, C, the quality of care extended to its children, Q, and the mother's hours devoted to nonmarket activities, L.7 Let those preferences be represented by a direct utility function, U = U(C, Q, L) where utility is increasing in C, Q, and L. The labor force participation of the father is assumed to be predetermined and, hence, exogenous. The static framework also implicitly treats the parents' prior family formation, fertility, education, and savings behavior as exogenous variables.
Denote the mother's hours spent working in the market by H. The mother's total available time, K, can be divided between market and nonmarket activities such that
Nonmarket hours, L, are defined to include maternal child care, other household production activities, and leisure. Besides the care they receive from their mother, children can receive care from paid and unpaid sources.8 Let F be a dichotomous variable which 7 Because the model effectively examines only one decision maker, it can easily be extended to single-parent families. The article's focus is limited to married mothers for reasons of sample homogeneity and tractability. Married and single mothers face very different opportunity sets. Married mothers have the potential time and income resources of their husbands. Married mothers' budget constraints are also less likely to be complicated by transfer kinks.
8 Limiting the family's choice set to paid and unpaid arrangements represents a strong, restrictive assumption. The reduced choice set may group together very different types of care. The caution applies more to paid than unpaid care. Kisker et al. (1989) found that unpaid arrangements generally represented unregulated care by relatives and neighbors. In contrast, paid care contains three qualitatively distinct arrangements-licensed (regulated) care, other nonrelative care, and relative care. The restriction to paid and unpaid care is imposed in this article for comparability with existing research and for tractability of the econometric model. equals one if the family utilizes any paid care and which equals zero if the family utilizes maternal or unpaid nonmaternal care exclusively. Total care quality for the family's children depends on inputs of maternal care, paid and unpaid nonmaternal care, and other goods. Specifically, let Q -Q(L, F, C; aQ),
where aQ represents a set of conditioning factors (e.g., number and age distribution of children, parents' education, safety of the children's neighborhood) which affect the production of care quality. Care quality is assumed to increase with inputs of maternal care and market goods. The contribution of F to overall quality is ambiguous and depends on the quality of paid care relative to maternal and unpaid nonmaternal care. For simplicity, the relative quality of paid care conditional on aQ, L, and C is assumed be exogenously determined.9 Paid child care is priced in terms of consumption goods, C. Let the cost of paid care services be given by PF = PF(H; ap), where costs depend on the mother's hours of work and a set of conditioning factors, cap. Families are assumed to take the cost schedule as given. Letting W represent the mother's available hourly wage rate, the budget set can be expressed as
where N denotes nonlabor income and Y denotes total income. The earnings of others in the household aside from the mother are included in N and taken to be exogenous. Notice that paid care utilization enters the model in two ways. Market care services may enter beneficially as an input to the production of child care quality. Market services also appear in the budget constraint and are assigned an explicit cost PF. In contrast, unpaid services enter the model only as an input to the production of quality. Thus, the decision to utilize paid or unpaid care depends only on the absolute cost and relative quality of paid care. The availability and possible nonpecuniary cost (e.g., room and board, reciprocating time transfers) of unpaid care are not explicitly considered.
To remedy this omission, this article assumes that nonmarket care is available to all families at some indirect cost and respecifies the model to include such costs.'0 In particular, let the indirect cost of unpaid care be 9Thus, other than conditioning on cQ, L, and C, this approach makes no distinction between high-and low-quality paid care. A further limitation is that the approach does not consider alternative dimensions of "quality" such as convenience and dependability.
10 Descriptions and evaluations of alternative restrictions appear in Ribar (1990) . 
III. Econometric Specification
The article derives a structural econometric model which is based on direct utility comparisons over different care utilization and labor supply alternatives. To obtain its econometric specification, the article imposes several restrictions on the theoretical model. First, the article adopts a parametric specification for the family's preference function. Note that the objective function in (4) can be written as a function of income, labor supply, and paid care utilization. The article expresses the objective function as a generalized quadratic in these three arguments such that 
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Ribar Specification (7) can be interpreted as a flexible approximation to (4) in which the coefficients represent combinations of utility and care quality production parameters.1' Second, the article restricts the family's choice set by limiting the mother's possible labor supply outcomes to zero, part-time, or full-time hours and by assuming that families with nonworking mothers utilize no paid care.'2 These restrictions imply that each family chooses from among five options: (1) mother does not work, (2) mother works part-time and uses unpaid care exclusively, (3) mother works full-time and uses unpaid care exclusively, (4) mother works part-time and uses paid care, and (5) mother works full-time and uses paid care.
As written, specification (7) implies that differences in mothers' care utilization and labor supply decisions are generated entirely by differences in their effective wages, care costs, and unearned incomes. The article introduces additional heterogeneity into (7) 
where M represents observed determinants and v is a normally distributed error term. Equation (11) is estimated jointly with a labor force participation probit using maximum likelihood (Maddala 1983) . Estimating the determinants of paid care expenditures raises similar selectivity concerns. In the data, the care utilization decisions of nonworking women are not recorded. Expenditure amounts are also not observed for families who utilize unpaid care exclusively. In addition, expenditures over $100 per week are censored. Let expenditures on child care be a general function of hours of work, other observed determinants, and unobserved determinants such that
In PF= g(H, D; A) +, (12)
where D is a vector of observed variables, A is a vector of coefficients, and 4 is a normally distributed error term. Maximum likelihood is used to estimate the nonlinear expenditure specification (12) jointly with reducedform labor supply and care utilization equations. The econometric procedure accounts for the possible endogeneity of H, selectivity from H and F, and censoring. A detailed description of the likelihood function appears in appendix B."5
To identify the wage and price parameters in the model, exclusion restrictions are imposed on the vectors M and D and on the exogenous determinants of H and F. The model assumes that wages are a function of human capital, regional variation, and demand effects. Demand effects as measured by the local unemployment rate and average annual wage rate for private employers are assumed to have little direct effect on the decision variables and thus appear in the wage determinants only. The cost of market child care is assumed to be a function of quality, supply cost, and regional variation. From this list, supply cost, as measured by the local average salary for service workers, appears to be a reasonable candidate for identifcation.
IV. Data
The primary empirical source for the analysis is the Survey of Income and Program Participation. The SIPP is a nationally representative longi-tudinal sample that contains a wealth of demographic, income, and labor supply information. Observations are drawn from wave 5 of the 1984 panel which was fielded during the winter of 1984-85. Among the data collected in wave 5 were responses to a series of questions concerning child care.
In the SIPP, the available economic data include hours of work and earned and unearned income for everyone in the household 15 years of age and older. For this article, monthly totals for the economic variables are computed for the last full month prior to the interview date. The mother's monthly pretax unearned income is computed by aggregating the family's reported unearned income with the earned incomes of all other family members. Monthly hours of work and earned income are computed for "salaried" mothers (families with self-employed mothers are excluded from the extract).
The actual hourly wage rate for employed mothers is obtained by dividing monthly earned income by monthly hours. Parameter estimates from the selectivity-corrected log wage equation are used to predict pretax wages for each mother in the sample. Estimation results for the log wage equation appear in appendix C.
Applicable demographic variables drawn from the SIPP include the composition of the household, the ages and educational attainment of its members, the race of the household head, and the household location. The SIPP also contains information on the cost and utilization of child care arrangements. For employed mothers, child care data were recorded for the three youngest children under the age of 15 for 1 week in the month prior to the interview. Available information for each child includes the primary and secondary care mode choice. Data are also reported for families' total weekly child care expenditures. For families that utilize paid services, the article projects care expenditures to a monthly aggregate. Parameter estimates from selectivity-and endogeneity-corrected expenditure equations are used to predict pretax part-time and full-time care costs for each family. Estimation results are discussed in the next section.
The econometric analysis uses after-tax measures of monthly income with and without paid care expenditures at zero, part-time, and full-time hours. Monthly part-time hours are assumed to equal 86.6 (20 hours per week for 4.33 weeks), and full-time hours are assumed to equal 173.2 (40 hours per week for 4.33 weeks).'6 For each of the five joint care and work categories, taxes are estimated by projecting the monthly pretax income to an annual total; allowing for the standard deduction, exemptions, and marriage penalty exclusion; computing the appropriate federal income tax amount (less the EITC and CDCTC, if applicable); computing the appli- The second specification in table 2 tests the linearity assumption from the previous model by relaxing the restriction on Aho and allowing expenditures to be a smooth nonlinear function in hours of work. The results strongly reject the assumption of linearity. In particular, the estimate on Aho is significantly less than one, and the log likelihood increases substantially. The coefficient estimate indicates that child care expenditures increase with hours but at a decreasing rate. To provide a clearer picture of the implications of these results, table 3 reports the predicted expenditures under specifications 1 and 2 at alternative hours points using sample means for the independent variables. Although both specifications lead to similar predictions of full-time expenditures, the part-time costs generated by specification 2 are higher than those generated by specification 1.
The third specification in table 2 presents an alternative test of the linearity assumption in which AhO is set at one but the restriction on Afo is relaxed. This corresponds to an expenditure function with both fixed and linear marginal components. As in specification 2, the linearity assumption is strongly rejected. The estimates indicate that the average fixed costs of paid child care are $92 per month ($21 per week) and that the marginal costs are $0.83 per hour. In table 3, the predicted full-time costs associated with specification 3 are again similar to those from the linear specification. The predicted costs at 86.6 hours are almost identical to the predictions from specification 2.
Predicted expenditure/hours profiles from three other specifications are listed at the bottom of table 3. For brevity, individual coefficient estimates for these models are not listed. In specification 4, the log expenditure equation has been rewritten to include generally parameterized fixed and linear marginal components such that In PF= A'D + A'DH +
The predicted fixed costs are substantially higher and the implied marginal costs are much lower than in the previous specifications. Nevertheless, the predicted full-time expenditures from specification 4 are similar to those reported for the previous specifications. Specification 5 appends a quadratic term in hours to (14) so that log expenditures depend on a fixed component and a nonlinear variable component. The significant increase in the likelihood value indicates that specification 4 should be rejected in favor of specification 5. The predicted fixed cost from specification 5 is similar to the fixed cost from specification 3. Predicted full-time expenditures are also close to previous estimates. In the final specification, the observed determinants of expenditures are parameterized to have separate effects depending on whether the mother works full-or part-time. The cutoff between full-and part-time employment is defined as 151.5 hours per month (35 hours per week). Specification 6 yields predictions of full-time expenditures which are similar to the fulltime (173.2 hours) predictions from the previous models. Predicted parttime expenditures from specification 6 are higher than the previous predictions at 86.6 hours.
Choosing the best specification from the six listed in table 3 is problematic because not all of the models are nested. Clearly, specification 1 is rejected in favor of either specification 2 or 3, and specification 4 is rejected in favor of specification 5. Beyond this point, however, nested comparisons are not possible. While predictions of full-time costs do not appear to be sensitive to the choice of model, there is considerable variation in the predicted part-time costs. In its imputations, the article uses specification 5 because it has the most general parameterization and yields a prediction for part-time expenditures which is in the middle of the range of estimates." Table 4 reports results from four specifications of the structural econometric model. The first specification in table 4 is a restricted model in which the interaction terms ye,, and y~f and the marginal parameter on paid care utilization, 3f, are set to zero. Thus, the family's objective function in specification 1 is a standard quadratic in income and hours of work with an interaction between hours of work and paid care utilization.
B. Structural Care Utilization and Labor Supply Results
The first 10 coefficients (68-680) in table 4 represent the effects of the listed variables on ph, the marginal parameter on hours of work. A positive coefficient indicates that the variable has a positive effect on labor supply. For specification 1, standard results obtain. Labor supply decreases with the number of small children, the mother's age, and residence in a metropolitan area. Work experience, residence in the South, and being nonwhite are estimated to have positive effects on labor supply.
The next fourteen coefficients (-iY14) give the effects of the listed variables on the interaction between paid care utilization and hours of work. Positive coefficients are indicative of factors which make paid arrangements more attractive as labor supply increases. As expected, the number of small children, the mother's education, and residence in a metropolitan area increase the likelihood of paid care utilization. The mother's age and the number of adults in the household are estimated to have negative effects on paid care usage. As in the expenditure results, coefficients on the statelevel policy variables provide mixed support for hypotheses regarding care In the third and fourth columns of table 4, specifications 1 and 2 are reestimated using a subsample of married women with at least one child under the age of 6. Mothers of small children are examined because their care constraints are likely to be more pressing than the constraints for mothers of older children. The precise behavioral implications of these constraints, however, are unclear. On the one hand, the salience of the child care constraint might lead mothers of preschoolers to be more sensitive to changes in care costs. On the other hand, limited care options might decrease this group's observed sensitivity to changes in costs. The results from specifications 3 and 4 appear to be consistent with this second hypothesis.
Overall, the coefficient estimates from specification 3 are weaker than their counterparts from specification 1. Among the labor supply parameters, the number of children from ages 6 to 10, residence in the South, and residence in an urban area lose their significance. The coefficients for the number of small children and the mother's age remain negative and significant; the coefficients on work experience and race remain positive and significant. When we turn to the paid care utilization parameters, the number of small children, the mother's age and education, residence in an urban area, and the state quality variables lose their significance. The number of children from ages 6 to 10 and the number of adults in the household are each estimated to have significant negative effects on paid care utilization. As in specification 1, the family's objective function appears to be concave in income and hours of work. There also still appears to be a significant negative correlation between ? and X. When the interaction terms are added in specification 4, the log likelihood increases dramatically. However, virtually all of the estimated coefficients lose their individual significance. As in specification 2, the contradictory results suggest that the addition of interactions leads to multicollinearity.
The economic implications of the results from the four structural specifications are summarized in table 5. For each specification, table 5 reports elasticities of the labor force participation and care utilization decisions with respect to changes in after.-tax wages, care costs, and unearned incomes. The estimates in table 5 have been obtained by taking means of the relevant elasticities calculated for each individual in the sample.
The results from specifications 1 and 2 indicate that married women's employment has a small negative income elasticity and that paid care utilization among working women has a small positive income elasticity. Assuming that nonworking women use no paid care, the combination of these effects implies that overall utilization is almost perfectly income inelastic. From specifications 3 and 4, mothers of preschoolers appear to be more sensitive to changes in unearned income than are mothers generally. Employment and paid care utilization for married women with children under 15 are estimated to be relatively sensitive to wage changes. The uncompensated wage elasticities for employment and paid care utilization conditional on employment range from .366 to .526 and .224 to .285, respectively. The wage elasticities with respect to employment are close to the estimates reported by Kimmel (1993) to have strong negative effects on paid care utilization. As with the wage results, the effects are larger for mothers generally than for mothers of preschoolers. Overall, the results suggest that increases in care costs cause mothers to switch care arrangements but not to leave the labor force.
C. Policy Implications
As a final exercise, the article reports the results of several policy simulations in tables 6 and 7. Table 6 The second policy change examined in tables 6 and 7 is a proposal to make the CDCTC fully refundable. A refundable CDCTC would benefit low-income families with little or no tax liability. From table 7, the average potential annual subsidies to part-and full-time workers increase by $37 and $20, respectively. The corresponding increases for mothers of preschool-age children are $48 and $27. These changes have virtually no effect on employment or paid care utilization. Indeed, the only discernible effect from making the CDCTC refundable is a small increase in paid care utilization among part-time workers. While refundability has little effect on behavior, the policy does have other distributional implications (for discussions of this issue, see Barnes 1988 and Robins 1988b) .
The article next considers the effects of replacing the CDCTC with a flat 25% subsidy on child care expenditures. Unlike the tax credit, the subsidy is fully refundable, is not adjusted for income, and has no upper limit. Under this scheme, the potential subsidies for part-and full-time workers would increase by roughly 40%. Despite its large cost, the flat subsidy would have almost no effect on married women's labor force participation and only a small effect on paid care utilization. As in the two previous simulations, most of the increase in paid care use would come from women working part-time.
Another proposal is to increase the eligible expenses under the CDCTC to $3,600 for one child and $7,200 for two or more children. In principle, this proposal would help middle-and upper-income families whose potential benefits under the CDCTC have been eroded by inflation.20 However, the policy change has little practical effect on average benefits in table 7 because few families in the sample incurred expenses in excess of the existing CDCTC maximums. Not surprisingly, the behavioral effect of increasing eligible expenditures is negligible.
The article next considers a comprehensive proposal which has been put forward by Robins (1988b) . He recommended making three modifications to the current tax credit: (1) make the tax credit refundable, (2) increase the eligible expenses to $3,600 and $7,200, and (3) establish a sliding scale for expenses starting at 80% for families earning less than $10,000. Robins's proposal is very generous-the potential benefits for part-and full-time workers increase by 86.3% and 51.6%, respectively. 20 When it was introduced in 1976, the CDCTC covered 20% of the first $2,000 in care expenses for one child and the first $4,000 in expenses for two or more children. When the CDCTC was changed from a flat percentage to a sliding (30%-20%) scale in 1982, the eligible expenses were reset to $2,400 for one child and $4,800 for two or more children. These nominal limits have not been subsequently adjusted. Thus, the real value of the CDCTC has declined for upper-income families since 1976 and for all families since 1982.
The results from table 6 indicate his plan leads to a moderate increase in part-time employment, a small increase in full-time paid arrangements, and a larger increase in part-time paid arrangements. These behavioral effects, especially the expansion of paid care use, would increase the realized cost of Robins's plan substantially.
Finally, the article examines two proposals which have been periodically discussed by politicians. The first of these is a plan, which was offered by President Bush during the 1988 campaign, to extend a large refundable tax credit to all families with children. The tax credit would not have been conditioned on parents' employment and, thus, would have acted as an income subsidy. Table 6 While the article provides interesting and important results, several avenues remain open for future research. A serious limitation in the present analysis is the broad definition of care modes. Grouping all purchased care into one category simplifies estimation but may mask differences in costs, quality, and preferences. More complicated structural econometric techniques (e.g., the Simulated Method of Moments estimator for nonlinear budget sets recently developed by Keane and Moffitt [1991] ) which allow for expanded choice sets should be considered. Another constraint on the analysis is the lack of direct information on the quality attributes of care. State-level data are used; however, community-and center-specific information would be more appropriate. Data on quality "outcomes" such as developmental effects would also be helpful. Future work should also consider other family decisions such as husband's labor supply and parents' fertility. Both decisions increase the dimensionality of the problem. A model of joint family labor supply would be useful in examining the determinants of shift work; a model of fertility would be useful in examining quality and quantity trade-offs. A final avenue would be to extend the analysis to single-parent families. Here program participation decisions complicate the budget constraint and increase the dimensionality of the problem. Nevertheless, such an analysis would help to inform the debate on the relationship between child care and economic self-sufficiency. 
